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Synopsis
The first two parts of the review provide background on Russell’s biography
and on developments in the foundations of mathematics in the early part of
the twentieth century that will help the reader set Logicomix in context. The
third part contains critical remarks on 1) the relationship between Logicomix
and reality; 2) the issue of faithfulness of the graphic novel to the development
of ideas in philosophy of logic and the foundations of mathematics; 3) logical
inaccuracies; 4) the connection to madness and tragedy.
Logicomix. By Apostolos Doxiadis, Christos H. Papadimitriou,
Alecos Papadatos, and Annie di Donna, New York: Bloomsbury
USA, 2009. (US$22.95, 352 pages. ISBN-10: 1596914521.)
Logicomix is a graphic novel about Bertrand Russell’s life (up to 1939)
and the intellectual contribution Russell made to the foundations of logic
and mathematics. Its ambition is to convey to the reader the excitement of
an intellectual quest, that of the attempt to give a definitive foundation of
mathematics, and the psychological complexities of the relationship between
the man – his passions, his deep fears, etc. – and his intellectual work.
Logicomix is divided into 6 main chapters to which one must add three
other chapters (Overture, Entracte, Finale) in which the team who wrote
and designed Logicomix talk about the project, its motivation and their, at
times conflicting, takes on what the moral of the story is supposed to be.
Logicomix also contains a Notebook which provides additional information
on facts and ideas.
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The six chapters are titled:
1. Pembroke Lodge [Russell’s childhood]
2. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice [Russell’s studies in Cambridge and his love
of Alys]
3. Wanderjahre [travels to Paris and Germany]
4. Paradoxes [Russell’s paradox and collaboration with Whitehead in writ-
ing Principia Mathematica]
5. Logico-Philosophical Wars [relation to Wittgenstein; World War I, Rus-
sell and Wittgenstein during the war; the Tractatus ]
6. Incompleteness [Go¨del’s theorems; Russell’s second wife Dora, and the
education of their son John (Beacon school); Wittgenstein as a teacher;
neopositivism; the rise of Nazism; the issue of U.S. involvement in
World War II]
The three additional chapters introduce some of the major issues that
the story is also supposed to capture. For instance in Overture the theme of
logic versus madness is introduced in a conversation between Christos and
Apostolos; the topic is pursued later in other chapters and in the Entracte
where Anne [editorial assistant Anne Bardie] and Christos also happen to
be looking for a theatre where Anne is rehearsing in a representation of
Aeschilus’ Oresteia. The introduction of tragedy is supposed to have parallels
with the search for foundations and this is pursued in the Finale. I will come
back to these themes later. But before getting there, I would like to present
in more detail some biographical elements of Russell’s life (Section 1) and
some major milestones in the foundational debate (Section 2), which might
help the reader in setting Logicomix in context. The details will also be
instrumental for the critical comments in Section 3.
1. Russell’s life
Logicomix recounts the main events of Russell’s life by following the
(imagined) delivery of a lecture by Russell himself recapturing the main
events of his life and work. Actually, the events of Russell’s life being re-
counted do not go beyond those related to his early life, adolescence, student
days and up to his first marriage and imprisonment for protesting the in-
volvement of the USA in the first world war. Treated in much less detail
is the period 1918-1939 where most of the attention is devoted to concep-
tual developments. Since the imagined lecture is delivered before the official
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entrance of the U.S. in War World II, no mention is made of Russell’s life
between 1940 and 1970.
Russell was born on 18 May 1872 from a prominent aristocratic family.1
His paternal grandfather, John Russell, had been Prime Minister twice (1846-
1852 and 1865-1866).
His parents, John and Katherine Louisa, were unconventional. His fa-
ther was an atheist and accepted his wife’s love relationship with Douglas
Spalding, a tutor for the children.
Russell had one older brother, Frank (he does not appear in Logicomix ),
and a younger sister, Rachel. Tragedy struck the family in 1874 when both
Russell’s mother and his sister Rachel died of diphtheria. Two years later
Russell’s father died of bronchitis. Thus, from 1876, Frank and Bertrand
lived with their grandparents at Pembroke Lodge in Richmond Park. Once
the grandfather died in 1878, the grandmother came to play a central role in
their lives. Her religious devotion and formality led to a stern atmosphere in
which Bertrand kept his inner life to himself. As a consequence, Russell grew
up feeling lonely and indeed the first volume of Monk’s biography of Russell
is subtitled “The spirit of solitude.” He thought about suicide several times
and in his autobiography he claims that the desire to learn more mathematics
is what kept him from his self-destructive tendencies. While he received
his education from several tutors at home, it was his brother Frank who
introduced him to Euclid’s Elements and that was to have a fundamental
impact in his intellectual development.
From that moment on mathematics played a central role in Russell’s life
and career. In 1890 he won a scholarship to read for the Mathematical Tripos
at Trinity College where he studied mathematics and philosophy obtaining
his B.A. in mathematics in 1893. While a student there he became close to
A. N. Whitehead and G. E. Moore.
At the age of 17, Russell fell in love with Alys Pearsall Smith. They
married in 1894 but it was not a happy marriage and things fell apart al-
most immediately. But it was only in 1910 that they separated. During the
early 1910s, Russell had some significant sentimental relationships, the most
important of which was the one with Ottoline Morrell (this however is not
mentioned in the story). The years between 1900 and 1919 are of course cen-
1The standard biography of Russell is the two volume work by Ray Monk [6, 7]. See
also [10].
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tral to his intellectual career and his meeting with Wittgenstein took place
in 1911. But before touching on this period I will recall the last event that
plays an important role in Logicomix, namely Russell’s pacifist engagement
during the WWI which led to his dismissal in 1916 from Trinity and to a
later jail term of six months in Brixton prison in 1918. Russell was 46 years
old at the time and Logicomix does not go in great bibliographical detail
beyond this part of his biography. One plausible reason for stopping there
is that by this time his contribution to the foundations of mathematics was
over.
2. Russell’s intellectual contribution to the foundations of mathe-
matics
In order to understand Russell’s role in the foundations of mathemat-
ics, it is useful to recall Dedekind’s contribution. Dedekind gave, by means
of set-theoretical techniques, a thoroughgoing justification of analysis, and
thus of irrational numbers, in his booklet Continuity and Irrational Numbers
(1872). In this work, irrational numbers are defined as entities corresponding
to the cuts in the field of rational numbers. The reader not acquainted with
cuts can visualize a cut as the set of rational numbers which are less than
or equal to a given real number. Dedekind’s justification of the notion of
irrational numbers presupposed however the notion of rational number and
that of infinite set or rationals. It was also Dedekind’s belief that the notion
of number in general could be characterized by appealing to basic logical
concepts. This he attempted to show in his work Was sind und was sollen
die Zahlen (1888) which presents a foundation of the natural numbers based
on his theory of chains, that is sets with specific properties. The reduction of
analysis to logic (containing a large amount of what we classify as set theory)
seemed to have been achieved once and for all. However, problems began to
emerge. The process of reduction of arithmetic to logic had in fact used at
various stages a number of problematic notions, or at least as problematic
as the notions that had to be grounded, e.g., the notion of infinite set, the
notion of set of all objects of thought (this appears in Dedekind’s proof of
the existence of an infinite set), and a number of problematic procedures,
the so-called impredicative definitions (for instance defining the set of natu-
ral numbers as the intersection of every set containing 0 that is closed under
successor). What is characteristic of such definitions is that they define an
entity (a set in the case of the natural numbers) by quantifying over a collec-
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tion which already contains the entity being defined. From a constructivist
point of view the definition “generates” the entity and thus the entity being
generated cannot already be part of the collection over which one quantifies
in order to bring it about.
Well-known is also Frege’s attempt to provide a logicistic foundation for
arithmetic and the great difficulties which he encountered in carrying out the
project. In the case of Frege, the logicism in question is much more sharply
defined than it was in Dedekind. The idea was to isolate the principles of
formal logic and then, by means of a translation of mathematical concepts
into logical concepts, to prove within logic the (translation of) the standard
mathematical theorems. To accomplish his goal, Frege had assumed that for
any property P (x) it made sense to talk about the course of values of P (x) as
a totality. More formally, and anachronistically, Frege postulated that given
any P (x), one could speak of the totality of objects satisfying P (x), that is
∃X∀x(x ∈ X if and only if P (x)).
Russell’s paradox showed that even at this very basic level one could run into
problems. He considered the following property P (x) = “x 6∈ x” and showed
that the set X such that x ∈ X if and only if x 6∈ x (which is supposed to
exist according to Frege’s postulation) gives rise to an antinomy: X ∈ X if
and only if X 6∈ X. This effectively brought Frege’s attempt to the ground.
One more central development needs to be mentioned, namely the devel-
opment of set theory, due to Georg Cantor, during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. While set-theoretical procedures had already been in
use, it was only with Cantor that set theory as an independent area of math-
ematics was born and systematized. Cantor developed ordinal and cardinal
arithmetic making use of very powerful non-constructive reasoning principles
and assumptions. He had also realized the danger of paradox involved in cer-
tain set-theoretic procedures and had distinguished, in correpondence with
other mathematicians, between “consistent” and “inconsistent” totalities.
The years following the discovery of Russell’s and other paradoxes wit-
nessed an attempt to take care of them by means of different strategies. The
most important ones are those of Zermelo and Russell.
Zermelo, following Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry, offered an ax-
iomatization of set theory, which assumed only the existence of those sets
whose definition could be given through a “definite propositional function”
[definite Klassenaussage]. His axiom of separation was the cornerstone of the
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building. It stated that given any set Y , one could collect into a set X the
elements of Y satisfying a property P (x). More formally
Axiom of Separation: If P (x) is a “definite propositional func-
tion” and Y is an already given set then
∃X∀x(x ∈ X if and only if x ∈ Y and P (x)).
Zermelo’s formalization is at the basis of our formalization of set theory
(known as ZF). Notice that among the “definite propositional functions” one
allows “¬(x ∈ x)”; this is therefore a significant expression. The paradox
is blocked by the fact that we can now only form, for any set A, the set
B = {x : x ∈ A and ¬(x ∈ x)}. But B does not give rise to a paradox.
Russell, in an attempt to revive logicism, developed a theory of types
in which the type of self-referential situation evidenced by Russell’s paradox
could not arise. In particular, so-called impredicative definitions (see above)
were excluded by eliminating even the possibility of expressing x ∈ x and its
negation.
One of the consequences of this was a rather awkward reconstruction
of mathematics. In particular one had to deal with real numbers of differ-
ent levels. In the attempt to avoid these undesired consequences, Russell
introduced the notorious Axiom of Reducibility which states that for any
set defined at some level n there is already an extensionally equivalent set
at level 1. Russell’s definitive achievement in this area is the three-volume
work Principia Mathematica [13], written with Whitehead and published in
1910-1913.
What I have described was only the beginning of some major develop-
ments in the foundations of mathematics that characterized the first three
decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, among the various ways to deal
with the problems generated by the new set-theoretic mathematics, and in
particular the paradoxes, we find reactions such as those of Poincare´ who
rejected the construction of sets requiring quantification over the totality of
sets to which the defined set belongs (impredicative definitions). His “intu-
itionistic” foundation of mathematics was the harbinger of a more radical
form of intuitionism championed by Brouwer and his intuitionist followers.
To be consistent with their intuitionistic principles, these thinkers were will-
ing to sacrifice a good deal of classical mathematics (including great parts of
set theory). By contrast, Hilbert was interested in proving the consistency of
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all of classical number theory, analysis, and set theory. In 1905 he conceived
of the possibility of treating mathematical proofs as mathematical objects.
This was to lead to Hilbert’s program – developed in the 1920s and 1930s –
a program for the foundation of mathematics that aimed at preserving all of
mathematics by providing an axiomatization of various areas of mathemat-
ics (number theory, analysis, set theory) and proving mathematically their
consistency using only mathematical principles satisfying stringent criteria of
intuitiveness and evidence. This developed into the discipline of metamath-
ematics, or proof theory, that was supposed to use only “finitistic” thought.
Let us conclude this section then by emphasizing that the Russellian
type-theoretic reconstruction of logic provided the context for technical de-
velopments in mathematical logic in the 1910s and 1920s and additionally
was at the center of fundamental reflections in philosophy of mathematics,
such as those carried out by Wittgenstein, Ramsey and Carnap. Moreover,
an important mathematical result was to influence the course of both types of
investigations: Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. The theorem had profound
consequences for both logicism and Hilbert’s program.
Logicomix manages to recount much of the developments described in
Sections 1 and 2 with flair and appealing graphics. While the details of the
technical developments could only be hinted at, the graphic novel does a
splendid job at conveying the main ideas and milestones of the developments
sketched both in Section 1 and 2.
3. Critical remarks
Page 315 of Logicomix contains the following disclaimer:
Logicomix and reality: Logicomix was inspired by the story of the
quest for the foundations of mathematics, whose most intense
phase lasted from the last decades of the 19th century to the
eruption of the second world war. Yet, despite the fact that its
characters are mostly real persons, our book is definitely not –
nor does it want to be – a work of history. It is – and wants to
be – a graphic novel.
After admitting that several aspects of the graphic novel deviate from fact
then the authors add:
Still, we must add this: apart from the simplification that was
necessary to accommodate it into a narrative work of this kind,
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we have not taken any liberties with the content of the great
adventure of ideas which forms our main plot, neither with its
central vision, its concepts, nor – even more importantly – with
the philosophical, existential and emotional struggles that are
inextricably bound with it (p.316)
In this last section I would like to comment on
1. The relationship between Logicomix and reality;
2. The issue of faithfulness to the development of ideas;
3. Some logical inaccuracies;
4. Madness and tragedy.
3.1. Logicomix and reality
The authors of Logicomix appeal to “comic license” (p.77) to take liberties
with the real historical course of events. Some deviations are quite small and
innocent. For instance, we know that it was Russell’s brother Frank who
introduced him to Euclid’s Elements whereas in Logicomix this is left to a
tutor and Frank does not appear. Other discrepancies are more serious. For
instance, the story recounts a meeting of Russell with Cantor and one with
Frege, which, as the authors frankly admit (p.315), never took place.
Of great import for the story is the description of Russell’s fears and night-
mares as a child. The chapter titled “Pembroke Lodge” has Russell hearing
screams coming from a secret room but no one is willing to acknowledge
what is going on until he discovers that uncle Willie, his father’s brother, is
secretly kept in one of the rooms and that he is mad. In actual fact, Russell
never heard of uncle Willie until he was 21, namely when he decided to marry
Alys and his grandmother tried everything to stop him. In particular, she
revealed to him the streak of madness running through the Russell family.
I found this deviation from reality to serve a narrative purpose by giving a
vivid representation of the deep fears described by Russell when he wrote
about his childhood and puberty.
By contrast, I was unable to see what role it served to describe Frege as a
lunatic and a rabid anti-semite. While it is true that in the last two months
of his life Frege wrote some rather objectionable entries in his diary [1, 5],
the caricature we are presented with (see panel on the next page) seems to
me to be gratuitous. The Notebook at the end of Logicomix can at times also
be misleading in that while it is meant to set the historical record straight it
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writing a series of rabid treatises attacking parliamentary 
democracy, labour unions, foreigners and, especially, the Jews, 
even suggesting “final solutions” to the “Jewish problem”. He died 
in 1925. (p. 326) 
 
This obviously refers to Frege’s diary. This diary was written in the last two 
months of Frege’s life and not “in the last decades of his life”. Moreover, where 
are the “treatises”? There are three entries with comments on the Jews and 
although Frege’s comments on the matter are certainly objectionable, these entries 
do not speak of “final solutions” nor of “the Jewish problem”. This type of 
language was instead typical of the Nazis and by associating Frege with these 
expressions the Notebook ends up portraying Frege as a Nazi. Moreover, a 
reading of the notebooks does not show a paranoid or rabid thinker. It shows a 
very rationale thinker trying to cope with the immensity of the social and 
economic crisis that faced Germany after the treatise of Versailles.  So, while his 
conservative, monarchic, point of view and his anti-semitism are certainly 
ends up falsifying he historic l reco d. For instance, in the entry on Frege
we read:
In the last decade of his lif he became increasingly paranoid,
writing a series of rabid treatises attacking parliamentary democ-
racy, labour unions, foreigners and, especially, the Jews, even
suggesting “fina solutions” to the “Jewish problem.” He died in
1925. (p.326)
This obviously refers to Frege’s diary. Thi diary was written in the last
two months of Frege’s life and not “in the last decades of his life.” Moreover,
where are the “treatises”? Ther are three entries with comments on the Jews
and although Frege’s comments on the matter are certainly objectionable,
these entries d not speak of “final solutions” nor of “the Jewish problem.”
This type of language was instead typical of the Nazis and by associating
Frege with these expressions the Notebook ends up portraying Frege as a
Nazi. Moreover, a reading of the notebooks does not show a paranoid or rabid
thinker. It shows a very rational thinker trying to cope with the immensity
of the social and economic crisis that faced Germany after the treatise of
Versailles. So, while his conservative, monarchic, point of view and his anti-
semitism are certainly objectionable that is no ground to make Frege into
a lunatic or a paranoid. Similar considerations apply to the way Cantor is
depicted but I will not delve into that.
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Another instance concerns the historical entry on Hilbert:
Though in outward appearance and behavior Hilbert gave the
impression of a paragon of normality and mental health, the way
he treated his only son, Franz, raises questions. When the boy
was diagnosed with schizophrenia, at age 15, his father sent him
off to an asylum, where he spent the rest of his life. Hilbert never
visited his son. He died in 1943. (p.327)
But the historical record shows that Franz was interned at age 21 and was
released in 1917 (at which point he would have been 24). Moreover, he lived
with his family again after his release (see [8]).
Finally consider what the Notebook reports on von Neumann:
There is no evidence that [Russell] was in the audience during
Go¨del’s “incompleteness” talk – he probably wasn’t and Hilbert
certainly wasn’t, though von Neumann certainly was and did say
“it’s all over” right after. (pp.341-342)
The graphic novel has Go¨del’s presentation take place in Vienna. It is indeed
correct that the first presentation of the result took place in Vienna. But
John von Neumann was not there. We have the minutes of that meeting in
the hand of Rose Rand and there we have in the audience a local Viennese
teacher called Robert Neumann (see [12] and [2]). I wonder if this is the
source of the confusion. Before this presentation in Vienna, Go¨del stated
the first incompleteness theorem in Ko¨nigsberg in September 1930 in an off-
hand remark (but not a presentation) during the general discussion on the
last day. Immediately after, he was cornered by John von Neumann who
asked for more details. But I know of no source that indicates that von
Neumann exclaimed “it’s all over.” In correspondence with Bernays and
Go¨del he did however indicate that he thought Go¨del’s theorems meant for
him the failure of Hilbert’s program. That sounds more reasonable. (See [2]
for documents bearing on this exchange.)
3.2. The portrayal of intellectual ideas
I will focus on two issues: a) the characterization of the foundations as
the search for certainty and b) Wittgenstein’s Tractarian philosophy to which
Logicomix devotes quite a bit of attention.
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3.2.1. Foundations as a search for certainty?
Over and over again the foundational quest is portrayed by Logicomix as
a search for certainty. This is described as Russell’s main goal (p.114, p.256)
not only when he is attempting to settle the problem of foundations in Prin-
ciples of Mathematics but well after the writing of Principia Mathematica.
Whatever the case might be for the early Russell up to 1903 –and there is
indeed evidence that the search for certainty in mathematics and natural
science might well have been Bertrand Russell’s initial impulse to engage in
foundational research– to characterize his foundational work as a search for
certainty after that period misses Russell’s intellectual development. Indeed,
already in [9], in a lecture in 1907 (“The regressive method of discovering
the premises of mathematics,” published in [11, pp.272-283]), and then also
quite explicitly in Principia Mathematica (p.v and p.59), Russell points out
that foundational work in mathematics does not aim at certainty, which is in
principle unreachable, but rather at an explanatory task. Indeed, contrary
to what the authors have Russell say in the graphic novel on p.185, for the
real Russell “1 + 1 = 2” is more certain to us than any of the logical axioms
postulated by Principia.
 9 
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According to him, the role of the axioms of Principia is similar to that of the 
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Incidentally, Gödel held similar positions (see Mancosu 2001 for corroborating 
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3.2.2 The Tractatus.  
 
According to him, the role of the axioms of Principia is similar to that
of the hypotheses in natural science which are not meant to increase the cer-
tainty of the empirical phenomena with which we are acquainted but rather
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to explain them. Incidentally, Go¨del held similar positions (see [3] for cor-
roborating evidence that both Russell and Go¨del held such views on the role
of foundations). I am also at a loss to understand what is meant by claiming,
as Alecos does on p.265 of the graphic novel, that it was the Tractatus [14]
that shook Russell’s dream of certainty.
3.2.2. The Tractatus
Concerning the Tractarian theory known as the “picture-theory of lan-
guage,” I should say that I admire the authors for having attempted the
challenge of treating it in the story. But there is a point where their presen-
tation misses the mark. The picture theory of language is a theory about
how propositions represent or depicts reality. They represent reality because
they have in common with it the “logical form.” But Wittgenstein is very
careful to distinguish the role of representation or depiction played by the
proposition in representing reality and the role played by the elements that
are connected in the proposition (simple names according to Wittgenstein).
The role of the simple names is not that of representing or picturing but sim-
ply that of standing for or going proxy for the simple objects corresponding
to the names. Thus when on p.256 of Logicomix we are told that as the toy
cannon is a model of the real cannon, so also the word “cannon” is a model
of the real cannon, the explanation misses the important distinction made
by Wittgenstein.
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[Picture 3]. 
 
 
 
Wittgenstein says: 
 
The name is not a picture of the thing named. The proposition only 
says something in so far as it is a picture!(Der Name ist kein Bild 
des Bennanten! Der Satz sagt nur insoweit etwas aus, als er ein 
Bild ist!) Notebooks, October 3, 1914 (Wittgenstein 1984) 
 
In the Tractatus (see 2.131) the same distinction is captured by the opposition 
between the role of the elements of the picture, vertreten (to go proxy for; to stand 
for), and the role of the picture, darstellen, vorstellen (to represent). 
Another claim attributed to Wittgenstein, this time in the entry on the 
Tractatus in the Notebook, is that he saw “mathematics and logic as machines for 
producing tautologies” (p. 338) While one can claim that for Wittgenstein logic is 
tautological, he never made this claim for mathematics.  
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Wittgenstein says:
The name is not a picture of the thing named. The proposition
only says something in so far as it is a picture! (Der Name ist
kein Bild des Bennanten! Der Satz sagt nur insoweit etwas aus,
als er ein Bild ist!) [Notebooks, October 3, 1914 [15]]
In the Tractatus (see 2.131) the same distinction is captured by the opposition
between the role of the elements of the picture, vertreten (to go proxy for; to
stand for), and the role of the picture, darstellen, vorstellen (to represent).
Another claim attributed to Wittgenstein, this time in the entry on the
Tractatus in the Notebook, is that he saw “mathematics and logic as machines
for producing tautologies” (p.338). While one can claim that for Wittgenstein
logic is tautological, he never made this claim for mathematics.
3.3. Some logical inaccuracies
Obviously, Logicomix would have missed its intended aim, had it turned
into some sort of “logic for dummies” or “logic for poets.” The intent of
the authors was not to teach technical material to the reader. However,
since technical results play a large part in the intellectual quest, the authors
rightly added in the Notebook sections describing the nature and import of
such results. It is unfortunate that in some cases the technical details are not
correct. Hopefully, this can be changed in a second edition of the graphic
novel. I will only mention the two most important occurrences. The first
occurs in the description of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems on p.328. The
text reads:
Incompleteness Theorem. In 1931, the 25 years old Kurt
Go¨del proved two theorems that are sometimes referred to as
“the” Incompleteness Theorem – though occasionally this form
is used to denote the first of these. The completeness of a logical
system is the property that every well-formed (i.e., grammatically
correct by the rules of the system) proposition in it can be proved
or disproved from the system’s axioms. Go¨del’s earlier Complete-
ness Theorem shows that there is a simple such axiomatic system
for first order logic.”(p.328)
But this description confuses two different notions of completeness, syntactic
(the one relevant to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems) and semantic (the one
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relevant to the semantical completeness of first-order logic). First-order logic
is semantically complete but not syntactically complete (for instance “there
are exactly two objects” is neither provable nor disprovable from first-order
logic).
The second case I want to mention, I would like to characterize as mis-
leading in the extreme. In the entry on “Predicate calculus” we read:
Rigorously defined, the version of predicate calculus called first-
order logic employs simple mathematical objects as variables,
whereas in second-order logic variables can also be sets, making
possible statements like “there is a set S”. This, more powerful
language, can express all known mathematics. (p.333)
In first order logic variables range over objects in a given domain; in second-
order logic we also have variables that range over the subsets of that given
domain. But this is not captured by the above characterization which, if
taken at face value, seems to say that in first-order logic we cannot have
variables ranging over sets. But obviously we do that all the time in the-
ories such as first-order ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel with Choice). Incidentally,
it is first-order ZFC that is considered powerful enough to express most of
classical mathematics. The claim that one needs to go to second-order logic
for expressing “all known” mathematics is undermined in this context. If we
need to go to second-order then we will need to go to even higher-orders.
3.4. Madness and Tragedy
I will conclude by expressing my discomfort, respectively puzzlement,
with two topics that run through the book: a) logic and madness; b) tragedy.
I will do so by raising two issues:
a) So why should logic be more closely connected to madness than any
other areas of human activity? The rate of mental illness in the general
populations is estimated at 6%. Consider now [4], a comprehensive article
on the history of mathematical logic from 1900 to 1935. Of the some 66
people working in logic/the foundations of mathematics in the period 1900-
1935 mentioned there, we know of only four cases of those with periods of
mental illness: Cantor, Scho¨nfinkel, Post and Go¨del. In other words, a rate of
approximately 6%, which does not seem exceptional. I will grant that I have
not studied the medical history of all the these people, nor is it clear what the
reference class should be, but my question still stands. Do we have any hard
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evidence on this issue? Or is this simply mythology? My discomfort2 has its
source in the danger that my area of investigation, logic and the foundations
of mathematics, should be gratuitously associated with mental illness and
paranoia. This is likely to have negative reverberations with at least some of
the reader of Logicomix. In light of the above, I find the suggestion running
through Logicomix that there is an intrinsic association between madness and
the pursuit of certainty in the foundations of mathematics to be unfounded,
misleading, and potentially damaging.
b) Logicomix states (see especially p.305) but does not make explicit the
parallel between the Oresteia and the quest for foundations. The explanation
given on p.305 relates the Oresteia to historical events in Europe but not to
the debate on foundations. So, all in all, I do not find that the authors make
the parallel in a convincing way.
4. Conclusion
I enjoyed reading Logicomix immensely. The authors have tackled an ex-
tremely complicated subject with thought provoking ideas in an aesthetically
pleasing and entertaining fashion. Thus, my few critical remarks should not
mislead you. I highly recommend Logicomix even though my recommenda-
tion is qualified: the reader should provide his/her grain of salt.
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